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[1] Homicide-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-A conviction
of first dpgree murder is sustained by evidenrp that dl'fl'ndant
killed a club owner in the commission of n robbery. (Pen.
Code, § 189.)
[2] Criminal Law-Instructions-Testimony of Accomplices.-Jf
the uudisputl'd evidence establishes that a witness is an accoJl1plice, the jury should be so instructed.
[3] Id.-Instructions-Testimony of Accomplices.-Where therp
was evidence tending to negative the participation by witnesses
in the robbery and murder charged, as where they testified
that they knew nothing about the possibility of a robbery
until they and others met in defendant's room, that they refused to take part in a projected robbery of a place about
100 miles away, that they drove with defendant and codefendant to the club, at which the crimes were committed,
in the belief that the only purpose of the trip was to
borrow a car, that they were afraid that if they refused
to go to the club the car of one witness would be taken by
force, and that they did not know until after they returned
to defendant's room that any robbery of the club had been
contemplated, the question whether they were accomplices
to the crime for which defendant was on trial was properly
left to determination of the jury, and it was not error to fail
to instruct that they were accomplices as a matter of law.
[4] Id.-Evidence-Accomplices and Corroboration.-If witnesses
in a robbery and murder case were guilty as a matter of law
of the crime of concealing a felony (Pen. Code, § 32), this
would not in itself make them "liable to prosecution for the
identical offense charged against the defendant on trial" 88
required by Pen. Code, § 1111, defining an accomplice.
[1) See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 17; Homicidl', § 189.
[3] Questions as to who are arcomplices, within rule requiringcorroboration of their testimony, as one of law or fact, note, 19
A.L.R.2d 1352.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 13(6); [2. 3] Criminal
Law, ~ 826: [4] Criminal Law, § 574; [5] Criminal Law, § 1437(9):
[6,7] Criminal Law,~68S: [8] Criminal Law,~S30; [9] Criminal
Law, ~ 832; [10] Crilllinal Law, § 1382(28); [11 ] Criminal Law,
~ 1382(31); [12] Robbery, § 31; [13] Robbery, § 35; [14) Criminal
T·llW, §572; [15,16] Homicide, §242; [17-19) Homicide, §236.
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[6] Id. - Appeal- Harmless Error - Instructions - Accomplice
Testimony.-FlI.ilure t.o inl'<t.rup.f. t.hat a codefendant charged
with robbl'ry alld mnral'r Will'< an aCllomplice as a matter of
law was not reversihle enor where the court clearly and correctly instructed the jury on the definition of an accomplice,
where the jury knew that he had been indicted with defendant,
that' he testified that he had committed the crime and that he
had withdrawn his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of
guilty, and where the district attorney stated in his argument
to the jury that "we feel that he was an accomplice, there is
no doubt about it," as under these circumstances it is improbable that the jury considered that codefendant was not
an accomplice and that a different verdict would have been
reached had an instruction been given that he was an' accomplice.
r6] Id.-Instructions-Cautionary Instructions-Accomplices.-It
is error to instruct the jury that an accomplice's testimony
should be viewed with "caution" without also instructing the
jury in the language of the statute. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2061(4).)
[7] Id.-Instructions - Cautionary Instructions - Accomplices.An instruction that the testimony of an accomplice ought to
be viewed with distrust, and that this means that the jury
must give such testimony the weight to which the jury find
it to be entitled after examining it with "care and caution"
and in the light of all the evidence in the case, when read as a
whole, is a correct statement of the law.
[8] Id.-Instructions-Testimony of Accomplices.-An instruction
in a murder and robbery case that "If 'either the crime of
murder or robbery, the commission of which is alleged in the
indictment, was committed by any of the witnesses in this
case, then as a matter of law such witness was an accomplice, assuming that you find that the defendant .•• also
participated in either of said crimes" is not objectionable as
limiting the meaning of accomplice to one who' actually did
or committed the criminal act, when such instruction is read
with another instruction that "All persons concerned in the
commission of a crime who either directly and actively commit the act constituting the offense or who knowingly and
with criminal intent aid and abet in its commission or, whether
present or not, who advise and encourage its commission, are
regarded by the law as principals in the crime thus committed and are equally guilty thereof."
£9] Id. - Instructions - Testimony of Accomplices.-An instruetion that "In determining whether or not the testimony of
an accomplice has been corroborated as required by law, you
must . . . assume to be removed from the case the testimony
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of the accomplice, and then examine all other evidence with
a view to determining if there be any inculpatory evidence,
that is, eyidencc tending to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense," and that "If such other evidence
does do that, then the testimony of the accomplice is corroborated; if it does not, then there is no corroboration, although the accomplice may be corroborated in regard to any
number of facts sworn to by him," does not erroneously permit the jury to find corroboration of the testimony of one
accomplice in the testimony of other accomplices, when such
instruction is read with another instruction that "The corroboration of an accomplice required by law may not be supplied by the testimony of one or more accomplices, but must
come from other evidence or circumstances, or from the
testimony of one or more witnesses who were not accomplices."
[10] Id.-Appeal- Harmless Error - Evidence - Confessions of
Others.-Any error in denying defendant's .motion for a mistrial on the ground that the confession of a codefendant was
admissible at the trial of defendant only if such codefendant
and defendant remained jointly on tria'l until the cause was
submitted to the jury, and that such confession was not admissible after codefendant withdrew his plea of not guilty,
was not prejudicial to defendant where all matters set forth
in the confession were subsequently in evidence when such codefendant testified as a witness for the People.
'
[11] .Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence-Expert Testimony.
-Although a slip on a pillow taken from deceased's bed at the
time of initial investigation of his room was missing when the
pillow arrived at a laboratory for analysis, alleged error in
allowing expert testimony regarding the similarity of fibres
swept from the pillow with fibres swept from defendant's
clothes, on the ground that when examined the pillow was
not in the same condition as at the time of the murder, was
not reversible where defendant failed to show how the absence
of the pillow slip could have prejudiced him.
[12] Robbery-Evidence.-Testimony of a codefendant that he
was armed with a .38 revolver at the time of the robbery
charged, if competent, supplies sufficient evidence to sustain
a eonyiction of first degree robbery where defendant, although
personally unarmed, aided and abetted the commission of the
crime. (Pen. Code, §§ 31, 211a.)
[13a,13b] Id.-Evidence-Corroborative Evidence.-Inasmuch as
Pen. Code, § 1111, does not require that an accomplice be corroborated as to every fact to which he testified but only that
the corroborative evidence tend to connect defendant wi'th the
commission of the crime in such a way as reasonably lllay
satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth, it is not

)
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necessary to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice in a
robbery case that a deadly weapon was used in the robbery
where the testimony of other witnesses constitute sufficient
corroborative evidence to connect defendant with the commission of the crime.
[14] Criminal Law-Evidence-Accomplices and Corroboration.Proof of the t'lements of a crime, as contrasted with proof of
defendant's connection with the commission thereof, may rest
on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
[16] Romicide-Punishment.-When a defendant is convicted of
first degree murder, the jury determines his punishment as
well as his guilt.
[16] Id.-Punishment.-Since thc issues of punishment and guilt
are determined at the same time in a murder case, to avoid
prejudice to either the People or the accused by injection of
collateral issues into the ease, evidence of the good or bad
habits and background of the accused is generally held inadmissible, and consideration of the jury is limited to the facts
and circumstances attending commission of the offense itself.
[17] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-The jury is not allowed to
weigh the possibility of parole or pardon in determining defendant's guilt in a murder ease, and it is error to give an
instruction which allows the jury to take into consideration
the consequences of a recommendation of life imprisonment
in arriving at that determination.
(18] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-To aid the jury in fixing
defendant's punishment in a murder case, the court may instruct the jury as to consequences of the different penalties
which may be impost'd so that an intelligent decision may be
.
made.
[19] Id.-Instruction~Punishment.-An instruction suggested by
defendant in a murder case that "he would not be subject to
parole under any circumstances" was materially incorrect
where, having had two prior convictions, he would have been
pligible for parole in nine year". (Pen. Codp, ~ 3047.5.)

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra Costa
County and from an order denying a new tria1. Wakefield
Taylor, Judge. Affirmed.
Prost'cution for murder and robbery. . Judgment of conviction of first degree murder imposing death penalty, and
of first degree robberv. affirmed.
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George C. Carmody and Richard D. Sanders for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, Charles E. McClung, Deputy
Attorney General, Francis W. Collins, District Attorney
(Contra Costa) and Davit! J. Levy, Deputy District Attorney,
for Hespondent.
THAYNOR, J.-Defendant Lovell Barclay was charged by
indictment with the murder and robbery of Alson G. Smith.
He pleaded not guilty and admitted two prior felony convictions of robbery and one of manslaughter. A jury returned verdicts of guilty of murder in the first degree without recommendation and of robbery in the first degree. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and he was
sentenced to death on the murder conviction and to prison on
the robbery conviction. The appeal to this court is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239b.)
Defendant operated a restaurant concession at the Hilltop Club in Crockett, owned by Smith. On the evening of
March 6, 1952, Daniel Ortiz, James Davis, and William Hatfield, three acquaintances of defendant, drove to Crockett
in Davis' car. They found defendant repairing his car and
after some conversation the four men went to defendant's
room in Crockett. The conversation turned to the subject
of robbery, and Hatfield and defendant discussed the possibility of robbing a place about 100 miles away. Defendant
said that his car was in poor mechanical condition, and the
two men asked Davis if they could use his car. Davis refused.
After some discussion, defendant suggested that Davis drive
him to the Hilltop Club so that he could borrow the car of a
bartender who worked there. Davis agreed and the four men
arrived at the Hilltop Club at about 3 o'clock in the morning.
Davis and Ortiz waited in the car. Hatfieid and defendant
forced open a window and entered the club. Knowing that
Smith kept most of his money in his room, the two men
went upstairs. Hatfield entered the room first and found
Smith asleep. He beat Smith until he was unconscious. The
two men then ransacked the room and found Smith's wallet
and several bags of silver. While their attention was distracted Smith rceoyered consciousness and sat up in bed.
Hatfield, using defelldant's nickname, called out: "Frisco,
what should I do'" Defendant said: "Man, you shouldn't
have said my name . . . I'll take care of him." Defendant
threw a blanket over Smith's head. Hatfield turned his
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back as defendant beat Smith about the head for approximately a minute. The two men took the money and returned
to the ear where Ortiz ana Davis were still waiting.
Ortiz and Davis asked about the bartender's car, but defendant and Hatfield laughed and told Davis to drive back
to defendant's room. After they arrived, Davis and Ortiz
saw Hatfield wash blood off his hands and watched the two
men diyiue the money. Realizing that a crime had been
eomlllitteu while Hatfield and defendant were in the club,
Ortiz and Davis complained that they had become involved.
They were given about $10 apiece and told to keep quiet.
The four men separated and went home.
Smith never regained consciousness and died the day after
the robbery. The injuries received from the beating were
the direct cause of his death. When Davis and Ortiz read
in a newspaper that Smith had died, they informed the police
of the crime, and Hatfield and defendant were apprehended.
Hatfield and defendant were tried jointly. Ortiz and
Davis testified as witnesses for the prosecution. Midway
through the trial Hatfield withdrew his plea of not guilty
and pleaded guilty. Subsequently he testified as a witness
for the prosecution. An expert witness testified that he
found fibres on defendant's clothes that matched fibres from
the bedding on Smith's bed, and that he found dust on defendant's clothes that matched dust on the roof of the Hilltop
Club taken from the point where defendant and Hatfield
made their entry. Defendant took the stand in his own
behalf and testified that on the night of the murder he completed his work at the club at about 1 :30 and then went
home to bed. He contended that Hatfield, Ortiz, and Davis
had falsely accused him of the crime in order to avoid reo
sponsibility for themselves. The jury rejected his defense
and found him guilty.
[1] Since the evidence in the present case shows that
defendant killed Smith in the commission of a robbery, it
is clearly sufficient to support the conviction of murder in
the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 189; People v. Coejield, 37
Ca1.2d 865, 868-869 [236 P.2d 570].)
Defendant contends that the court erred in not instructing
the jury that Davis, Ortiz, and Hatfield were accomplices as
It matter of law.
[2] An accomplice is "one who is liable
to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the
defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of
the aecomplice is given." (Pen. Code, § 1111.) If the
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undisputed evidence establishes that a witness is an accomplice, the jury should be so instructed. (People v. Wallin, 32
Ca1.2d 803, 809 f197 P.2d 734] ; People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal.
587, 601 l265 P. 230]; People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 436
L119 P. 901, 39 L.R.A.N.S. 704].) [3] Insofar as Davis
and Ortiz are concerned, however, defendant's contention
cannot be sustained. Davis and Ortiz testified that they knew
nothing about the possibility of a robbery until the four men
gathered ill defendant's room; that they refused to take part
in the projected robbery 100 miles from Crockett; that
they drove to the Hilltop Club with Hatfield and defendant in the belief that the only purpose of the trip was
to get the bartender's car; that they were afraid that if they
refused to go to the Hilltop Club, Davis' car would be taken
by force; and, that they did not know until after they returned to defendant's room that any robbery of the Hilltop
Club had been contemplated. From the testimony of Davis
and Ortiz the jury' could reasonably conclude that the robbery
of the Hilltop Club was an act independent of and foreign to
the original criminal design to rob a place 100 miles away,
and that Davis and Ortiz were thus not guilty of the murder
and robbery of Smith. (People v. Harper, 25 Cal.2d 862,
870-873 [156 P.2d 249] ; People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331, 335
[92 P. 861] ; see, also, Wharton's Criminal Law [12th ed.],
§ 258; 15 C.J.S., Conspiracy, § 74.) Accordingly, the question
whether or not Davis and Ortiz were accomplices to the crimes
for which defendant was on trial was properly left to the determination of the jury. (See cases collected in 19 A.L.R.2d
1352.) [4] If it is assumed that, as contended by defendant,
Davis and Ortiz were guilty as a matter of law of the crime
of concealing a felony (Pen. Code, § 32), they still would nbt
be "liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged
against the defendant on trial" as required by section 1111.
(People v. Collum, 122 Cal. 186, 187 [54 P. 589] ; see People
v. Wallin, supra, 32 Cal.2d 803, 807.)
[5] The People concede that Hatfield was an accomplice
as a matter of law and that it was error not to so instruct
the jury. The court, however, clearly and correctly instructed
the jury on the definition of an accomplice. The jury knew
that Hatfield had been indicted with defendant; they had
heard his testimony that he committed the crime; they knew
that he had withdrawn his plea of not guilty and entered a
plea of guilty. The district attorney stated in his argument
to the jury: "With Mr. Hatfield we feel that he was an accomplice; there is no doubt about it. As to Davis and Ortiz, you
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are to decide whether or not they are accomplices." Under
these eircumstances, it is improbable that the jury considered
that Hatfield was not an accomplice and that a different verdirt would have been rE:ached had an instruction been given
that hI' was an a(·complice. (See People v. Ferlin, su.pra, 203
eal. 587, 601-602; People v. Wahni.~h, 20 Cal.App.2d 58, 63
l66 P.2d 67i].)
TllP only evidellce hl'fore the grand jury to connect defendant with the crime was the testimony of Ortiz and Davis.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to set aside the indictment, on the ground that it was
not based upon evidence that would warrant a conviction by
a trial jury. (Pen. Code, § 921; ct. Lorenson v. Superior
Court, 35 Ca1.2d 49 [216 P.2d 859] ; People v. McRae, 31
Ca1.2d 184 [187 P.2d 741].) It is unnecessary to pass upon
this contention since, as we have seen, whether or not Ortiz
and Davis were accomplices of defendant was a question of
fact to be determined by the jury at the trial.
At the request of the People, the jury was instructed that:
"It is the law that the testimony of an accomplice ought
to be viewed with distrust. This does not mean that you
may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should
give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled after
examining it with care and caution and in the light of all
the evidence in the case." Defendant criticizes the italicized
part of the instruction, on the ground that the jury should
have been iristructed only in the language- of section' 2061 (4)
of the Code of Civil Procedure, that "the testimony of an
accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust," and that the
additional words "care and caution" prejudicially weakened
t.hf' instruction. [6] It is error to instruct the jury that
an accomplice's testimony should be viewed with "caution"
withont also instructing the jury in the language of the
statnte. (People v. Hamt1.ton, 33 Ca1.2d 45, "51 f198 P.2d
R73] ; see, also. People v. Dat1., 22 Ca1.2d 642, 653 [140 P.2d
R28].) [7] The instruction given in the present case, howeyer. rl'ad as a whole. is a correct statement of the law.
(People v. Hess. 107 Ca1.App.2d 407, 430 [237 P.2d 568];
People v. Chapman. 93 Ca1.App.2d 365, 381 [209 P.2d 121].)
[8] TIlt' jury was instructed t.hat: "If either the crime
of 1Illll'Iler or roblwr~', the commission of which is alleged in
the iJl(lil'1l1ll'llt. was committed by an~' of the witnesses in
this cast'. then as a matter of law such witness was an
accomplicf', assuming that you find that t.he defendant Bar-
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clay also participated in either of said crimes." Defendant
contends that the instruction erroneously informed the jury
that "only one of the witnesses, for example, Hatfield, could
be an accomplice, and not all of them." The instruction,
however, expressly applied to "any" of the witnesses. Defendant also contends that the word "committed" in the
instruction "eliminated from the definition of an accomplice
the meaning that one who' participates,' that is to say aids
or assists, or takes part in the crime, is an accomplice, and
limited the meaning of accomplice to one who actually did
or committed the criminal act." In another instruction, the
jury was informed that: "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime who either directly or actively commit the
act constituting the offense or who knowingly and with criminal intent aid and abet in its commission or, whether present
or not, who advise and encourage its commission, are regarded
by the law as principals in the crime thus committed and are
equally guilty thereof." When the two instructions are read
together, no error appears.
[9] The jury was instructed that: "In determining
whether or not the testimony of an accomplice has been
corroborated as required by law, you must, for the purpose
only of your consideration of that question, assume to be removed from the case the testimony of the accomplice, and
then examine all other evidence with a view to determining
if there be any inculpatory evidence. that is, evidence tending
to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.
If such other evidence does do that, then the testimony of
the accomplice is corroborated; if it does not, then there is
no corroboration, although the accomplice may be corroborated
in regard to any number of facts sworn to by him." Defendant contends that the instruction erroneously permitted
the jury to find corroboration of the testimony of one accomplice in the testimony of other accomplices, on the ground
that it told the jury that the test of corroboration was whether,
aside from the testimony of "the" accomplice, "all other
evidence" tended to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. Defendant contends that "all other
eyiflence" would inl'lude testimony of other accomplices so
that the jlll'~', eYen though it found Davis and Ortiz to be
3ccompli('t's, might Ilt'vertheless have considered their testimony as corroborative of the testimony of Hatfield. In the
instruction follo"'ing that quoted above, however, the jury
was told that: "The corroboration of an accomplice required
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by law may not be snpplif'd by d1e t.estimony of one or more
othf')' 1I(',~ompljet's. but must ('orne from ot.her eviriencc or
cir"'IIIJ1shtlll'('s, or fl"f}m the t.('stiIllOIlY of olle or more witnesses who were not accomplices."
'I'he two instructions,
read together, correctly state the law.
[10] Early in the trial a confession by Hatfield was admitted in evidence. The jury was instructed that it should
not consider the confession as evidence against defendant.
(See People v. Wade,71 Cal.App.2d 646, 652-65~ [163 P.2d
59J.) Subsequently, Hatfield withdrew his plea of not guilty.
The court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial and instructed the jury that the testimony regarding Hatfield's
confession was struck from the record and must be disregarded. Hatfield later testified regarding all the matters
set forth in his confession. Defendant now contends that his
motion for a mistrial should have been granted, on the ground
that the confession of Hatfield was admissible at the trial of
defendant only if Hatfield and defendant remained jointly on
trial until the cause was submitted to the jury. Since all
matters set forth in the confession were subsequently in evidence when Hatfield testified as a witness for the People, the
error, if any, was not prejudicial to defendant. (People v.
Simmons, 28 Ca1.2d 699, 721 [172 P.2d 18] ; People v. Higbee,
78 Cal.App. 455,459 [248 P. 927].)
[11] Police officers took the pillow and quilt from Smith's
bed and sent them to a laboratory for analysis. At the time
of the initial investigatio~ of Smith's room, the pillow was
covered with a slip, but the slip was missing when the pillow
arrived at the laboratory. The absence of the slip was never
explained. Defendant contends that it was error to allow the
expert witness to testify regarding the similarity of fibres
swept from the pillow with fibres swept from' defendant's
clothes, on the ground that when examined by the expert
the pillow was not in the same condition as at the time of
the murder. Defendant, however, does not show how the
absence of the pillow slip could have prejudiced him in any
way.
[12] Defendant next contends that his conviction of
robbery in the first degree is unsupported by competent eviIlt·uee. Robbery is of the first degree when it "is perpetrated
h~' torture or by a person being arme'd with a dangerous or
deadly weapon." (Pen. Code, § 211a.) There is no evidence
of torture in the present case, but Hatfield testified that he was
/inned wth a .38 revolver at the time of the robbery. Hat-
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fjpld '8 testimony, if competent, supplied sufficient evidence to
sustain dpfelldant's ('oJl\'ietion of first degree robbery since
defl'lIc1<l1It, IllthOllgh persoJlally unarmed, aided and abetted
the CO)]llllission of tIll' crillJP. (Pen. Code, § 31; People v.
Perkins, 37 Cal.2d 62, 64 l230 P.2d 353].)
[13a] Defendant contends, however, that the fact that
tllt'1"I' is no evidrnce to show that a deadly weapon was IIsed
ill tile robbrry other than the testimony of Hatfield, admittedly all accomplice, rel/uires the judgment to be modified
by reducing the degree of the crime to robbery in the second
degree. (Pen. Code, § 1181; see People v. Mendes, 35 Ca1.2d
537, 545-546 [219 P .2d 1].) This contention cannot be sustained. Section 1111 of the Penal Code requires only that the
corroborative evidence tend "to connect a defendant with
the commission of the crime in such a way as reasonably may
satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. It is
not necessary that the accomplice be corroborated as to every
fact to which he testifies." (People v. Trujillo, 32 Ca1.2d 105,
111 l194 P.2d 681] ; People v. Henderson, 34 Ca1.2d 340, 342343 [209 P .2d 785].) [14] Proof of the elements of the
crime, as contrasted with proof of the connection of defendant with the commission thereof, may rest upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. (People v. Harper,
25 Ca1.2d 862, 877 [156 P.2d 249] ; People v. Negra, 208 Cal.
64, 69 [280 P. 354] ; People v. Griffin, 98 Cal.App.2d 1, 25
[219 P.2d 519] ; People v. Briley, 9 Cal.App.2d 84, 86 [48
P:2d 734] ; People v. Knowles, 75,Cal.App. 229, 230 [242 P.
508] ; see 21 Cal.L.Rev. 247.) The testimony of Ortiz, Davis,
and the expert witness constituted sufficient corroborative
evidence to connect defendant with the commission of the
crime of robbery. [lSb] It was unnecessary also to corroborate the test.imony of Hatfield that a deadly weapon was
Ilsed therein.
The jury was instructed that it was in their discretion
whether the death penalty should be inflicted,· Six hours
*" The law of this !ltate provides that every person guilty of murdN
in the first degree sllall suffer death or confinement in the state prison
for life, at tIle discretion of the jury that finds him guilty. If you should
find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, it will be your
duty to determine which of the two penalties shall be inflicted, the death
penalty or ronfinement in the stnte prison for life. If you should fix the
penalty as confinement in the state prison for life, you will so indicate in
your \'erdict. using a form that will be handed to you when you retire
to deliberate, hut if you should fix the penalty as death, you will not
8pecify the death penalty in your verdict, and you will say nothing about
punishment in the verdict."
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after tile jury retired, it returned and the foreman asked:
"The jury would like to review that portion of your instructions concerning what factors, if any, in law may be properly
considered in determining whether the recommendation for
life imprisonment may be included in returning the verdict."
The court read again the instruction previously given. The
foreman then asked: "In the recommendation 'as a punishment therefor we find that he be imprisoned in the state
prison during the term of his life'-does it mean exactly that,
or is that sentence subject to termination by parole T" The
court replied that he didn't believe it was "within the
province of the jury to consider" that question. The court
then discussed the question with counsel out of the presence
of the jury. Counsel for defendant stated: "At this time
the defendant asks the court to instruct the jury that because
of the fact that a conviction of this offense would make him
a habitual criminal that he would not be subject to parole
1Iuder any circumstances." The court refused to give the
l'(>qllested instruction and the jury returned to its deliberations. Oue hour later the jury returned a verdict of murder
in the first degree without recommendation. Defendant contends that the ruling of the court was prejudicially erroneous,
011 the ground that the jury may have fixed the punishment
at death because of a mistaken belief that otherwise defendant
might bE.' released from prison on parole within a few years
(If his conviction.
[15] Whe]] a dE.'fendant iR convicted of murder in the first
clegrE.'e, the jury determines his punishment as well as his
guilt. (Pen. Cod~, § 190; People v. Sainz, 162 Cal. 242, 246247 [121 P. 922]; ct. Pen. Code, § 209 [kidnapping with
bodily harm]; Pen. Code, § 264 [rape of female under age
18] . ) [16] Since the issues of punishment and guilt are
det.ermined at tIle same time, there is danger that evidence
or instrnctions offered on the former issue may influence the
yprrlict on tlll' latter iSRue.Accordingly, to avoid prejudice
to ('ith('r thc PE.'ople or the accused by injection of collateral
issllcs into the case, evidence of the good or bad habits and
bacltground of the accused is generally held inadmissible
(People Y. Volenzuela, 7 Cal.2d 650, 653 [62 P.2rl142] ; People
Y. W1:ft. 170 Cal. ]04, 110-]11 [148 P. 928] ; 8(>1'. also, People
y. Lar1"':().~. 220 Cal. 236. 241,242 r30 P.2d 404] rcomt in discl'etion lllay pl'rmit defendant to S]lOW "something of his backf!round"1 ), and the consideration of the jury is limited to the
facts and circumstances attending the commission of the of-
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fense itself. (People v. Gosden, 6 Cal.2d 14, 30-31 [56 P.2d
211] ; People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 455 [249 P. 859] ; People
v. Perry, 195 Cal. 623, 639 [234 P. 890] ; People v. Pantages,
212 Cal. 237, 275 [297 P. 890] j see 11 So.Cal.L.Rev. 351.)
[17] For similar reasons of policy the jury is not allowed
to weigh the possibility of parole or pardon in determining
the guilt of the defendant, and it is therefore error to give
an instruction that allows the jury to take into consideration
the consequences of a recommendation of life imprisonment
ill arriving at that determination. (See People v. Letou,.neau,
34 Cal.2d 478, 494 [211 P.2d 865J.) [18] To aid the jury
in fixing the punishment of the defendant, however, the court
may instruct the jury as to the consequences of the different
penalties that may be imposed so that an intelligent decision
may be made. (People v. Chessman, 38 Ca1.2d 166, 189-190
[238 P.2d 1001J j People v. Osborn, 37 Ca1.2d 380, 384-385
[231 P.2d 850J j People v. Caetano, 29 Ca1.2d 616, 619 [177
P.2d 1] j People v. La Verne, 212 Cal. 29, 31 [297 P. 561] j
People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 459 [249 P. 859J; People v.
Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 387, 393.) In the Osborn case, the
court informed the jury that a recommendation of life imprisonment without possibility of parole would not be binding, thus impliedly answering in the affirmative the question
of the jury whether a person sentenced to life imprisonment
might be paroled. We stated: "It is understandable that
jurors, who are charged with the duty of fixing the penalty
in the event that they find a defendant guilty of first degree
murder, should be interested in knowing the nature and effect
of the penalties which they may impose j and neither reason
nor authority indicates that the trial court should be prohibited from enlightening the jurors when questions are asked
upon that subject." (37 Cal.2d at 385.) Recently, in People
v. Chessman, supra, it was held that there was no error in informing a jury that when a person is sentenced to life im.pri!;onment without possibility of parole there nevertheless
re.mains the chance that the defendant will be freed by pardon,
('ommutation, or action of the Legislature. The recent decisions of this court thus establish that a jury may consider
the consequences of a recommendation of life imprisonment
in determining the punishment of the defendant, although it
lIlay not consider tJle possible penalties in determining the
guilt of the defendant.
[19] The question remains whether error was committed
in the present case. The instruction suggested by defendant
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would have informpd the jury that "he would not be subject
to parole lIndpr allY circnm!;tances."
The instruction was
materially incorrect. Since defendant had two· prior convictions, he would have been eligible for parole in nine years.
(Pen. Code, § 3049.5.) All instructions actually given by the
court on the subject of punishment were correct statements
of the law under the decisions of this court; defendant cannot
show that any correct instruction offered by him was refused.
A t least under the circumstances of the present case, we do not
think that the trial court was required to offer an additional
instruction of its own motion. (Cf. Pwple v. Cook, 39 Cal.
2d 496, 500 [247 P.2d 567].)
The judgment and the order denying the motion for.a new
trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
.J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February
5, ·]953.

*Since manslaughter is not one of the crimes enumerat.ed in section
644 of the Penal Code, defendant's prior conviction of that crime did
lIot affect his status as a habitual criminal.

